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Japan has one of the longest average length of stay in hospital 
(ALOS) among developed countries. To curb the high ALOS, the 
Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare has launched a payment 
system reform where instead of the pre-reform fee-for-service system 
(FFS) a new per-diem prospective payment system (DPC/PDPS) 
has been gradually adopted. We develop a theoretical framework 
to model hospitals’ incentives under different payment systems 
and to study the impact of the reform on the ALOS. We show that 
hospitals with a longer (shorter) pre-reform ALOS shorten (lengthen) 
their post-reform ALOS. Furthermore, hospitals with longer pre-
reform ALOS have stronger incentives to use planned readmission 
to decrease the post-reform length of stay associated with a single 
admission. The theoretical predictions of our model match empirical 
evidence from the literature.
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I. Introduction
Japan, like many other OECD countries, has been struggling with 
the containment of soaring health care costs. Aging of the population as 
well as the spread of new expensive medical technologies resulted in the 
Japanese social health insurance system becoming highly subsidized 
(Besstremyannaya 2016). By 2012, central government financed 25.3% 
of health care expenditure (MHLW 2012c), which represented 10.2% 
of the government budget (Ministry of Finance 2012). With rapidly 
increasing medical care expenses, shortening the average length of 
stay (ALOS) in a hospital became an important political issue in Japan 
(Nawata and Kawabuchi 2013). Japan has one of the longest ALOS 
among developed countries, and it is more than twice as long as the 
ALOS for all OECD countries. In 2013, for example, the ALOS in Japan 
was 17.2 days as compared to 8.1 days for all OECD countries (OECD 
2015).
In response, the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) 
introduced a reform which was “... one of the largest and most important 
revisions of the payment system since the Second World War.” (Nawata 
and Kawabuchi 2013, p. 77). The new payment system is a prospective 
payment system (PPS), as opposed to the pre-reform fee-for-service (FFS) 
payment system. At first, it was introduced in 82 special functioning 
hospitals. By April 2013, 20% of acute-care (general) hospitals that 
account for 54.3% of hospital beds in Japan were financed by the new 
payment system (MHLW 2013).
The new payment system, called Diagnosis Procedure Combination/
Per Diem Payment System (DPC/PDPS), is an original prospective 
payment system developed in Japan. Similar to the prospective 
payment systems used in other countries, such as the DRG system 
in the U.S., the DPC/PDPS classifies various diseases, operations, 
treatments, and patient conditions and most of DPCs can be viewed as 
homogeneous. Differently from the prospective payment systems used 
in other countries, the Japanese DPC/PDPS is a per diem, rather than 
per episode, prospective payment system.
The per diem rate is set to incentivize hospitals to shorten the LOS 
via its stepdown feature: the rate becomes lower as the LOS becomes 
longer. Three periods, Period I, Period II, and the Specific Hospitalization 
Period, are determined for each DPC code. The initial period, Period I, 
corresponds to the 25th percentile of average length of stay (ALOS) for a 
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given DPC, and is reimbursed at the highest per-diem rate. Period II is 
set as the average LOS, that is, the 50th percentile. Once the patient’s 
stay goes beyond Period I, it is is reimbursed at a lower per-diem rate. 
Similarly, once the stay goes beyond Period II and reaches the Specific 
Hospitalization Period (defined as a stay between the average LOS and 
the average LOS plus 2 standard deviations) the per-diem rate becomes 
even lower.1
Despite all the attention to the long ALOS in Japan, surprisingly, 
“there are limited empirical studies on the impacts of the payment 
systems on LOS” (Takaku and Yamaoka 2019, p. 53). The DPC 
Evaluation Division of the Central Social Insurance Medical Council 
regularly publishes reports on the effects of the DPC/PDPS, however, 
as argued in Nawata and Kawabuchi (2013), these reports are no more 
than simple comparisons of the LOS. To address this issue, Nawata 
and Kawabuchi (2013) developed a proper econometric model to study 
the effect of the reform on the LOS for cataract operations in Japan. 
They use the data from six general hospitals, and find that the effect 
of the Japanese payment system reform on the LOS varied among the 
hospitals. For the short-ALOS hospitals, the ALOSs did not decrease. 
On the other hand, for the long-ALOS hospitals, the ALOS decreased 
significantly. Besstremyannaya (2016) reaches similar conclusion using 
a much larger dataset which includes nationwide administrative data 
for 15 major diagnostic categories in 1068 Japanese hospitals. She finds 
that average length of stay significantly increases for hospitals with 
short pre-reform length of stay and significantly decreases for hospitals 
with long pre-reform ALOS.
The change in hospitals’ incentives due to the introduction of the per-
diem prospective payment system resulted in some undesirable changes 
in hospitals’ behavior bordering plain manipulation.2 The switch to the 
per-diem prospective system was accompanied by a rise of the early 
1 Here and below the description of the Japanese DPC/PDPS is based on 
Nawata and Kawabuchi (2013) and Besstremyannaya (2016).
2 Takaku and Yamaoka (2019) show that the “midnight-to-midnight” definition 
of a “day” incentivizes health care providers to manipulate hospital acceptance 
times in emergency patients. They document a significant bunching in the 
number of acceptances at the emergency hospital around midnight: the number 
heaps a few minutes before midnight, but suddenly drops just after midnight. 
This is despite emergency episodes being smoothly distributed during nighttime.
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readmission rate and, specifically, planned readmissions (Hamada et al. 
2012; Yasunaga et al. 2005; Okamura et al. 2005). Notably, empirical 
evidence indicates that an increased reliance on planned readmission 
was specifically caused by the stepdown feature of the Japanese DPC/
PDPS, whereby longer LOS is reimbursed under a lower per-diem rate 
(Kondo and Kawabuchi 2012).
In this paper, we develop a theoretical model to study the impact 
of different payment systems on the hospitals’ LOS and hospitals’ 
incentives to rely on planned readmission. The payment systems we 
consider are the fee-for-service reimbursement scheme, FFS, which 
corresponds to the pre-reform system, and a per diem PPS with a 
length-of-stay-dependent step-down rate, SDR, which corresponds to 
the post-reform DPC/PDPS. To disentangle the effect of a switch to 
per-diem reimbursement system from the additional effect of the LOS-
dependent per-diem rate, we also study an intermediate reimbursement 
system which is a simple flat per-diem rate. We label it as PD.
We show that in our model the impact of the reform will differ across 
hospitals. The introduction of the per-diem prospective system gives 
hospitals with shorter pre-reform ALOS incentives to lengthen it, and 
to hospitals with longer pre-reform ALOS incentives to shorten it. This 
matches the findings from the empirical literature that we discussed 
earlier (Nawata and Kawabuchi 2013; Besstremyannaya 2016). 
Adding LOS-dependent reimbursement rates such that initial stay is 
reimbursed at a higher tariff, as in the DPC/PDPS, has unambiguously 
perverse incentives on hospitals’ LOS. The higher initial tariff increases 
hospitals’ marginal benefit from longer stay without affecting marginal 
cost. All hospitals, except for those with the longest ALOS, find it 
profitable to treat patients longer.
We then model the effect of the reform on the planned readmission 
rate. We introduce an extension of the model where we allow hospitals 
to choose in advance whether to treat a patient with one or two 
admissions, where the second admission is a planned readmission. 
While, naturally, there are purely medical reasons to provide a 
treatment with planned readmissions, in this paper we look at decision 
to use planned readmission solely due to financial considerations.3 
3 According to MHLW (2005) readmissions are classified into planned, 
anticipated, and unplanned. The reasons for anticipated readmissions are: 
1)anticipated worsening of medical condition; 2)anticipated worsening of 
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We show that the reform and, specifically, its stepdown per diem rate 
financially encourages hospitals to use planned readmission, and that 
hospitals with longer pre-reform ALOS have stronger incentives to treat 
patients using planned readmission. Intuitively, since each admission 
is reimbursed separately, the DPC/PDPS enables hospitals to benefit 
twice from higher initial rates by means of planned readmission. This 
result is consistent with evidence reported in Kondo and Kawabuchi 
(2012) and analysis of Besstremyannaya (2016). Besstremyannaya 
(2016) shows that the most pronounced effect of the reform on planned 
readmission rate was among hospitals in the 76-100 percentiles of the 
pre-reform ALOS, where it increased in 11 out of 15 Major Diagnostic 
Categories (Besstremyannaya 2016, Table V).
One theoretical consequence of hospitals using planned readmissions 
to game the system is that even though the LOS of a single admission 
becomes shorter under the post-reform DPC/PDPS, the complete 
treatment becomes longer. Thus, while the ALOS in Japanese has been 
steadily declining — 25 days in 2000, 17.2 days in 2013, 16.2 days in 
2017 (OECD 2015 and 2019) — our theoretical results suggests that 
one should be cautious when interpreting this decline and that it might 
not be entirely due to increased efficiency.
II. Japan’s inpatient prospective payment system
The Japanese inpatient PPS is a mixed system. The reimbursement is 
the sum of DPC and fee-for-service components. The DPC component is 
constructed as a per diem step-down rate based on the hospital’s length 
of stay. For each DPC, the amount of the daily inclusive payment is flat 
over each of the three consecutive periods: period I that contains up to 
the 25-percentile of ALOS calculated for all hospitals submitting data to 
MHLW;4 period II that contains the rest of the ALOS; and period III (the 
comorbidity; 3)patient was temporarily discharged to raise his/her quality of life; 
4)discharged from previous hospital stay at the patient’s request; 5)other.
The reasons for planned readmissions are: 1)operation after preliminary tests; 
2) planned operation or procedures; 3) chemotherapy or radiation therapy; 4) 
planned examinations/tests; 5) examination/operation was stopped during the 
previous treatment, and the patient was discharged; 6) patient was sent home to 
recuperate before an operation.
4 The initial rates were set on the basis of 267,000 claim data on patients 
discharged from 82 targeted hospitals in July-October 2002.
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Specific Hospitalization Period) that contains two standard deviations 
from the ALOS. After period III expires, hospitals are reimbursed 
according to the fee-for-service system. To create incentives for shorter 
length of stay, per diem DPC in Period I is set 15% higher than the 
average per diem payment of the patients whose stays were within the 
average LOS. For stays between Period II and Period III, on the other 
hand, the per diem rate is set 15% lower (see Figure 1).
The first version of DPCs consisted of 2552 diagnosis groups. Most 
of the groups (1860) had a sufficiently large number of cases and were 
rather homogeneous (Ikegami 2005). The per diem rates were set on the 
basis of these groups, which corresponded to about 90% of admission. 
The numbers of diagnoses and DPCs gradually increased from 2003, 
and as of 2012 there were 2927 diagnosis groups and 2241 DPCs. 
Along with the diagnosis, each DPC incorporates three essential issues: 
algorithm, procedure, and co-morbidity. Diagnoses are coded according 
to ICD-10 and the Japanese Procedure Code (commonly used under 
Notes:  Rate b is determined as the average amount of per diem payment in 
hospitals submitting data to MHLW. Rates a and c are set so that area A in 
Period I is equal to area B in Period II. Rate d is 15% lower than rate c. After 
period III expires, hospitals are reimbursed according to the fee-for-service 
system. Source: Besstremyannaya (2016).
Figure 1
Step-down per diem payment Scheme for a given dpc
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FFS reimbursement) is employed for coding procedures (Matsuda et al. 
2008, MHLW 2004).
The DPC component covers basic hospital fee, hospital expenditures 
on examinations, diagnostic images, pharmaceuticals, injections, and 
procedures costing less than 10,000 yen. The fee-for-service component 
reimburses the cost of medical teaching, surgical procedures, 
anesthesia, endoscopies, radioactive treatment, pharmaceuticals, and 
materials used in operating theaters, as well as procedures worth more 
than 10,000 yen (MHLW 2012a; Yasunaga et al. 2005).
The introduction of inpatient PPS is a voluntary reform for each 
Japanese hospital. The records of the Ministry of Health, Labor, and 
Welfare, and anecdotal evidence (e.g., Okuyama 2008) demonstrate 
that participation in PPS is voluntary: the decision is made by the 
hospital itself with no governmental pressure. There are several 
eligibility criteria: a hospital has to meet a threshold value of the MHLW 
nurse staffing ratio equal to 2 inpatients per nurse; has to follow the 
methodology for accounting of inpatient expenditure; and has to collect 
standardized data on prescribed drugs. In particular, the methodology 
for accounting inpatient expenditure includes the employment of 
special administrative staff, detailed book keeping, ICD-10 coding, and 
data processing (Sato 2007).
III. Basic Setup. Length of Stay
We consider three reimbursement systems: fee-for-service (FFS), 
which corresponds to the payment system used before the reform; the 
per diem prospective system with a fixed per diem rate (PD); and the per 
diem prospective system with a stepdown rate (SDR), which corresponds 
to the post-reform reimbursement, as explained in the previous section. 
The PD system is an intermediary between the FFS and the SDR, and 
enables us to isolate the effects of the switch to a per diem system from 
the effects of different per diem rates.
For a given diagnosis we assume that there is a variety of medical 
procedures and input combinations that could be used to treat a given 
condition, that we classify as discretionary and non-discretionary. Non-
discretionary procedures and input combinations is something that, for 
medical reasons, has to be done in order to treat the patient’s condition. 
Discretionary inputs and procedures are something that is employed 
beyond non-discretionary procedures either to complement or enhance 
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the effect of non-discretionary procedures. Discretionary inputs are 
not wasteful in terms of patients’ health and could include items such 
follow-up tests or pre-treatment screening.
Given that non-discretionary inputs procedures is something that 
the hospital has to perform, we will normalize them to zero. As for 
discretionary inputs, we will label them as I, where I ∈ [0, ∞). Employing 
discretionary inputs increases the patient’s length of stay as given by a 
function L(I ) where L(0) = 0, L'(I ) > 0 and L''(I ) < 0. As hospitals deal with 
many cases of a given diagnosis, we can think of L(I ) as the average 
length of stay for the diagnosis in a hospital. It will be convenient to 
describe hospitals’ optimization problem using the inverse function I(L), 
which is an increasing convex function of L.
The hospitals’ cost associated with the length of stay is given by a 
function γg(L), where g is a strictly increasing and convex function such 
that g'(∞) = ∞.5 Different hospitals have different γ, so that cost (and 
marginal cost) is higher for hospitals with higher γ. The heterogeneity 
parameter γ may reflect differences in equipment costs, human capital, 
or opportunity costs due to availability of personnel or bed occupancy 
rates. In addition, there is a direct cost associated with purchasing 
discretionary inputs which is equal to cI(L), where c ≥ 0. Thus, the total 
hospital’s cost is cI(L) + γg(L), and it is a convex function of L.
Two remarks are in order. First, the additive functional form above 
is used for its simplicity. One could use a more general cost function 
h(γ, I, L). With some technical conditions, such as h is an increasing 
function of all three inputs, convexity and h''γL > 0, the results below will 
hold. Second, given that L is a function of I, discretionary inputs affect 
the cost via two sources: directly and indirectly via L. This is to reflect 
the fact that there is direct cost of running a given test or procedure 
and then there are also costs associated with keeping a patient in 
the hospital, e.g., due to the load on medical personnel and medical 
equipment or the bed occupancy rate.
5 The assumption that g is a strictly increasing function of L is not without 
loss of generality. One can imagine that a faster treatment could be considerably 
costlier as it might require modern and more expensive equipment. Thus, the 
situation where g declines at first and becomes an increasing function later is 
conceivable. However, neither the FFS nor the PD systems will lead to a choice of 
L at the interval where g declines.
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A. Fee-for-service system
We model the fee-for-service as a system which reimburses hospital’s 
inputs usage at a fixed rate pI, where pI > c. The hospital’s maximization 
problem is
 γ− −II p I cI L g Lmax ( ) ( )
To allow comparison with per-diem and step-down per diem 
prospective payment systems, that we introduce later in the paper, we 
can equivalently re-write it as
 γ− −IL p I L cI L g Lmax ( ) ( ) ( ).
Optimal L is given by the FOC
 γ′ ′ ′= +Ip I L cI L g L( ) ( ) ( ).  (1)
The second-order condition is
 γ′′ ′′ ′′− − <Ip I L cI L g L( ) ( ) ( ) 0.
It is satisfied whenever the cost function g(L) is a more convex 
function than I(L), i.e. there exists a convex function ϕ(·) such that g(L) = 
ϕ(I(L)).6
We denote the solution to (1) as LFFS. By the envelope theorem it is a 













Indeed, the denominator is the SOC and is negative, and term g'(L) 
is positive since g(·) is an increasing function of L. Intuitively, higher 
γ results in higher costs associated with the LOS and, therefore, it is 
optimal for hospitals to choose lower L.
Proposition 1 summarizes the reasoning above.
6 Since g(L) = ϕ(I(L)), the FOC can be re-written as (pI - c - γϕ'(I(L))) · I'(L) = 0. The 
SOC then is (pI - c - γϕ'(I(L)))I''(L) - γϕ''(I(L)))I'(L) = -γϕ''(I(L)))I'(L) < 0.
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Proposition 1. The optimal length of stay under the fee-for-service 
system, LFFS, satisfies (1) and it is a decreasing function of γ.
B. Per diem prospective payment system
Under the flat per-diem PPS, hospitals are paid a fixed per-diem 
rate, −d, for each day that a patient stays in the hospital. The profit-
maximization problem under the per diem PPS is
 γ− −L dL cI L g Lmax ( ) ( ).  (2)
This formulation of a per diem PPS is related to, though different, 
from that in Grabowski et al. (2011) who study the Medicare’s adoption 
of a per diem PPS for skilled nursing facilities (SNFs) in 1998. The 
differences are as follows. First, in Grabowski et al. (2011) the intensity 
and the length of stay are two independent choice variables for SNFs. 
In our model, the only choice variable for hospitals is the length of stay, 
which is a function of intensity, i.e. I-inputs. Second, in our model the 
per diem rate is either constant (as in this section), or a decreasing step 
function of the length of stay (later in the paper). This assumption is 
appropriate given the specifics of the Japanese PPS reform.
The post-reform per-diem rate in Japan, −d, was determined based 
on the average per diem reimbursement under the pre-reform fee-
for-service system. In this subsection we assume that it is constant 
regardless of the duration of stay.7 In the next subsection we introduce 
the step-down per-diem rate that depends on the duration of stay which 
is similar to the payment system implemented in Japan.
Let LFFS be the optimal LOS under fee-for-service system for a given 
hospital with a given γ. Then, for a given hospital, the effective per diem 
reimbursement under FFS was:8
7 This system is similar to the Korean “new DRG” reimbursement system 
(described in Section V) where the per-diem rate for most cases (those within 
5%-95% of the LOS distribution) is fixed and does not depend on the duration of 
stay.
8 Under FFS, of course, hospitals were not reimbursed based on per-diem rate. 
We use term effective per-diem rate for an average daily payment the hospital 
effectively received under the FFS system.



















The optimal length of stay under the per-diem PPS, LPD, satisfies the 
FOC for (2):
 γ′ ′− − =PD PDd cI L g L( ) ( ) 0.  (4)
As one would expect, higher values of  −d, ceteris paribus, lead to longer 
LOS.
Proposition 2. In general, when comparing LOS under the FFS and PD 
reimbursement systems three scenarios are possible. Either
i) LPD > LFFS for any γ; or
ii) LPD < LFFS for any γ; or
iii) there exists γ0 such that LPD > LFFS if γ > γ0, and LPD < LFFS if γ < γ0.
When per-diem rate is given by (3) the first scenario is impossible. 
The proof is given in Appendix but the intuition is straightforward. 
Under the per-diem PPS the marginal benefit does not depend on L 
and is equal to −d. Under FFS the marginal benefit is pII'(L) and it does 
depend on L. Given convexity of I(L), hospitals with lower LFFS have 
lower marginal benefit under FFS. A switch to the per-diem system will 
increases their marginal benefit making longer LOS optimal. Similarly, 
hospitals with higher LFFS have higher marginal benefit under the 
FFS. A switch to the per-diem system will result in a decline of the 
marginal benefit making shorter stay optimal. The hospital for which 
pII'(L) = −d, if it exists, is what determines the threshold value of γ0. For 
this hospital the LOS will not change. In general, if −d is too high (low) 
then for all hospitals LPD > LFFS (LPD < LFFS). But given definition of −d in (3) 
the first scenario is impossible. This is because I(L) is convex and so 
I'(L) > I(L)/L . As we show in the proof it puts an upper bound on −d such 
that it cannot be too high so that LPD > LFFS for all γ.
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C. Per diem prospective payment system with a step-down rate
Previous analysis compared the LOS under the FFS and PD 
reimbursement rules, where per-diem rate was constant. To capture the 
specifics of the health care reform in Japan, where the per-diem rate is 
not constant but depends on the length of stay as shown on Figure 1, 
we consider an additional reimbursement system wherein the per-diem 
rate depends on the LOS.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that there are two, and not three 
as in the DPC/PDPS, periods with different per-diem rates. Specifically, 
let −L denote the the average LOS under the FFS system. We assume that 
during the initial α−L period a high per diem rate, q−d, is paid, where q > 
1 and α < 1. A lower per diem rate, τ−d where τ ≤ 1, is paid afterwards. 
We will refer to this reimbursement system as the SDR system (a 
reimbursement system with Step-Down per diem Rate).
The hospital’s profit function under the SDR is:
   α≤L Lif  (5)γπ
α τ α γ
 − −= 
⋅ + − − −
qdL cI L g L
L
qd L d L L cI L g L
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )  α≤L Lif
In what follows, we use L*PD(γ) and L*SDR(γ) to denote the optimal lengths 
of stay under PD and SDR reimbursement rules. The next Proposition 
characterizes the optimal LOS choice depending on γ.
Proposition 3. Let γPD be such that for a hospital with γPD the optimal 
LOS under the PD system is exactly α−L. Then
i) L*PD(γ) ≥ L*SDR(γ) if γ ≤ γPD;
ii) L*PD(γ) < L*SDR(γ) if γ > γPD.
The proof is given in the Appendix. The intuition is as follows. For low 
values of γ, as in case i), introducing a higher premium for shorter stay 
does not affect hospitals’ behavior compared to the PD payment system. 
With low γ the cost associated with LOS is small so that extra benefits 
from shorter stay are not sufficient to change hospitals’ incentives. 
At the same time, lower per-diem rate τ−d motivates those hospitals to 
decrease their LOS. At the same time, for high values of γ, those in case 
ii), having a higher per-diem rate for shorter stays perversely affects 
hospitals’ incentives and makes them willing to keep patients longer 
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than they would under PD.
The combined effect of the change from FFS to SDR reimbursement 
systems is, in general, ambiguous. It depends on the sizes of FFS → 
PD and PD → SDR effects, which in turn depend on parameter values, 
such as q and α. However, for hospitals with high γ, those with γ > 
max{γ0,γPD}, and for hospitals with low γ, those with γ < min{γPD,γ0}, both 
FFS → PD and PD → SDR changes have the same effect on the LOS. 
The Table below summarizes it: 
low γ (high LOS) high γ (low LOS)
FFS→SDR LFFS > LSDR LFFS < LSDR
Thus, our model predicts that hospitals should respond differently 
to the reform depending on their pre-reform LOS. On the one hand, 
hospitals high LOS will have incentives to decrease it, as the reform 
intends. On the other hand, those with low LOS will have financial 
incentives to prolong it in order to enjoy a higher per-diem rate. This is 
the opposite of the reform’s goal. Empirical literature provides support 
for these predictions. Nawata and Kawabuchi (2013) were the first to 
document that the national decrease in ALOS came along with some 
hospitals increasing their ALOS. The most direct test of our theoretical 
predictions comes from Besstremyannaya (2016) whose results directly 
confirm our predictions. Table IV shows a significant post-reform 
increase among hospitals with the shortest (0 to 25 percentile) pre-
reform length of stay and a significant decrease in the length of stay 
among hospitals with longest pre-reform LOS (51-100 percentile). 
Furthermore, the decrease of the ALOS is larger for hospitals in higher 
percentiles of the pre-reform length of stay.
D. Profit
Finally, we compare hospitals’ profitability under the three 
reimbursement systems. Let L*FFS denote the optimal LOS under FFS, 
and for notational brevity we do not reflect that it depends on γ. The 











184 SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
We use a qualifier “effective” to highlight that it is not the actual per 
diem rate since there is no per diem rate under the FFS system. From 
(6) and convexity of I(L) follows that effective per diem rate under FFS 
is an increasing function of LOS. That is hospitals with a longer length 
of stay (smaller γ) have a higher effective per diem rate under the FFS 
system; hospitals with a shorter length of stay have a lower effective per 
diem rate under the FFS system.
Under the PD system, the per diem rate is determined based on the 













One can show that a change from FFS to PD will increase (decrease) 
profitability of hospitals with short (long) pre-reform length of stay. 
Indeed, consider a hospital with γ high enough so that d(L*FFS) < 
−d. Then
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* * * *
FFS FFS FFS FFS FFS
* * * * * *
FFS FFS FFS PD PD PD PD
d L L cI L g L
dL cI L g L dL cI L g L
π γ
γ γ π
= − − <
< − − ≤ − − =
Here, the first inequality comes from the fact that d(L*FFS) < 
−d, and the 
second inequality comes from the fact that under per-diem rate −d it is 
L*PD, not L
*
FFS, that is optimal.
Similarly, hospitals with long LOS will have lower profit under PD 
than under FFS. Indeed, consider a hospital with γ low enough so that 
d(L*PD) > d. Then
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .
* * *
PD PD PD PD
* * * * * * * *
PD PD PD PD FFS FFS FFS FFS FFS
dL cI L g L
d L L cI L g L d L L cI L g L
π γ
γ γ π
= − − <
< − − ≤ − − =
The first inequality comes from the fact that −d < d(L*PD), the second 
inequality comes from the fact that under FFS it is L*FFS, not L
*
PD, that is 
optimal.
As for comparison between the PD and the SDR, it depends on τ. 
When τ = 1 then the SDR payment system leads to a strictly higher 
profit. However, by the envelope theorem as τ declines the profit weakly 
declines as well so the effect is, in general, ambiguous. For hospitals 
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with γ > γPD, however, the profit effect is unambiguously positive since, 
as it follows from the proof of Proposition 3, the value of τ affects neither 
the PD-profit nor the SDR-profit. Combining the two results we get that 
FFS < SDR for hospitals with sufficiently high γ and low pre-reform LOS, 
those with γPD. For other hospitals the effect is ambiguous.
Proposition 4 summarizes the reasoning above.
Proposition 4. For hospitals with low pre-reform LOS the reform will 
have positive effect on their profitability. For hospitals with high pre-
reform LOS the total effect is ambiguous and depends on values of q,τ 
and α−L. 
IV. Planned Readmission
Although there is still much inconsistency in economic research 
about the association between readmission and inpatient care (Ashton 
et al. 1997), a number of studies demonstrate that early readmissions 
may serve as an indicator of quality for hospital performance (Halfon 
et al. 2006; Lopes et al. 2004; Weissman et al. 1999; Ashton et al. 
1997). There are three types of readmissions (see footnote 4) and in this 
section we focus on planned readmissions as this is the type where the 
hospitals have the most control when deciding whether to use it.
While there are many purely medical reasons for planned 
readmissions, hospitals can use planned readmission to shorten the 
average length of stay at each readmission since, even if the same 
patient is readmitted with the same diagnosis, his or her treatment 
is recorded and reimbursed as a separate instance.9 Kondo and 
9 The Japanese government seems to be aware of hospitals’ incentives to 
manipulate the length of stay via readmissions. When the new payment system 
has been first introduced and it became clear that adoption of the DPC system 
led to an increase in readmission rate, the Japanese government summoned 
the chief executive officers of hospitals that had high readmission rates to 
have them explain the increase. It turned out that the increase was due to the 
large number of cancer patients who were discharged and then readmitted 
for chemotherapy and/or radiation therapy (both are classified as reasons for 
planned readmissions). In response the government adjusted the tariff so that 
the LOS period was no longer reset if the patient were to be readmitted within 
three days of the discharge: the LOS period continues to be counted from the 
date of the first admission and the discharge period were not to be included in 
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Kawabuchi (2012) argue that patients who require long treatment (e.g. 
rehabilitation after surgery owing to hip fractures) are vulnerable to 
premature discharges owing to the incentives inherent to the step-down 
per-diem inclusive payment. Therefore, it is important to understand a 
hospital’s financial incentives regarding planned readmissions and how 
the FFS and the SDR reimbursement systems affect these incentives.
We introduce the possibility of readmission changes as follows. 
In addition to determining the optimal length of stay the hospital 
needs to decide whether to treat a patient using one admission or two 
admissions, where the second would be a planned readmission. We 
assume that the decision regarding the number of admissions is made 
at the beginning of the treatment.
If a hospital chooses to treat a patient with one admission then, 
as before, its total cost is cI(L) + γg(L), where L is the LOS. Consider 
now the case when a hospital chooses to treat a patient with planned 
readmission. Let the patient’s LOS under the initial admission be L1 
and under the readmission be L2. Then the total cost is cI(L1) + cI(L2) + 
γg(L1 + L2) + F.10 Here cI(L1) is the cost of discretionary inputs used for 
the first admission, cI(L2) is the cost of discretionary inputs used for 
the second readmission, and F ≥ 0 is the fixed cost of the readmission. 
We assume that F is a random variable, distributed with cdf Φ(·). The 
reason for the assumption is two-fold. First, with a deterministic F, a 
planned readmission is a 0/1 decision, which is different from what 
is observed in the data. Second, random F captures the idea that the 
cost of readmission can vary depending on the circumstances such as 
patient condition or hospital occupancy rate.
A. Fee-for-service system
Hospital’s profit without the readmission is
the hospitalization period (Anderson and Ikegami 2011). Later, the three-day 
period was further increased to seven days (MHLW 2015, p. 32).
10 Alternatively one could use term γg(L1) + γg(L2) in the cost function instead 
of γg(L1 + l2). The only difference is that the latter, i.e. the one used in the paper, 
makes planned readmission less attractive financially because of convexity 
of g(·). We chose to use formulation where hospitals’ have weaker financial 
incentives to rely on planned readmission.
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 1
max ( ) ( ).IL p I cI L g Lγ− −
If a planned readmission is used the hospital’s profit is
 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2,
max ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .I IL L p I L p I L cI L cI L g L L Fγ+ − − − + −
Proposition 5. Under FFS hospitals will not use planned readmission 
iff F > 0.
Proof. Assume not. Let L1 > 0 and L2 > 0 be the optimal LOS under 
the first and second admissions. Without loss of generality we can 
assume that L1 ≥ L2. From the convexity of I(·) follows that for a small ε 
> 0
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 ,
I I
I I
p c I L p c I L g L L F
p c I L p c I L g L L F
ε ε γ ε ε
γ
− + + − − − + + − −
> − + − − + −
which is a contradiction to L1 ≥ L2 > 0 being optimal. Thus the two strict 
optima are (L*,0) and (0,L*), and therefore it is always optimal to avoid 
cost F and use one admission. 
B. Per diem prospective payment system with a step-down rate
The profit without the planned readmission is (5). The profit with the 
planned readmission is
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
,
2 2 ,
j i i j
qd L L if  L L L
F cI L cI L g L L qd L d L L L if  L L L
qdL qd L d L L if  L L L
α
γ α τ α α
α τ α α
 + ≤
− − − − + + ⋅ + + − ≥

 + ⋅ + − > >  
(7)
The first part of (7) is the treatment cost which does not depend on 
whether L1,L2 are above or below the threshold α−L. The second part of (7) 
is calculated based on the length of each admission. The top line in (7) 
corresponds to the reimbursement when the length of both admissions 
is short, i.e. shorter than α−L, so that the hospital is reimbursed under 
the premium per-diem rate q−d. The middle line corresponds to the 
case when both admissions are long, i.e. longer than α−L, and end up 
receiving daily payment τ−d for stays above α−L. The last line is hospital’s 
profit when one admission is long and another is short.
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Let 1 denote the optimal profit without the readmission and 2 the 
optimal profit with the readmission without the fixed cost F. Planned 
readmission is more profitable if and only if 2 − 1 > F. Then, for a 
given hospital the likelihood of using planned readmission is Φ(2 − 1). 
Note that the likelihood of readmission is a readmission rate, which 
is an observable variable (e.g. it is reported in MHLW’s administrative 
database).
The next statement shows that 2 − 1 is a decreasing function of γ, 
which means that hospitals with low γ have stronger incentives to use 
planned readmission than with high γ. The immediate and testable 
corollary of this result is that, other things being equal, hospitals with 
higher LOS are more likely to use planned readmission for financial 
reasons. It also shows that when hospitals choose to use planned 
readmission to decrease ALOS they succeed in that (L*1 + L
*
2) / 2 ≤ L
* . 
However, it is not due to faster and more efficient treatment of patients, 
as L* ≤ L*1 + L
*
2, but rather due to increased financial incentives to treat 
patients with two admissions.
Proposition 6. Let L* be the optimal LOS without readmission and L*1 








1(L* ) is a decreasing function of γ.
ii) (L*1 + L
*
2) / 2 ≤ L
* ≤ L*1 + L
*
2 for every γ. The former inequality is strict 
for hospitals with low γ. The latter inequality is strict for hospitals with 
intermediate values of γ. 
The proof is given in the Appendix. Intuitively, a higher per diem 
rate during the initial period of stay incentivizes hospitals to double 
the number of days for which they receive the premium rate. Hospitals 
with low γ, i.e. those with longer LOS have more to gain from planned 
readmission, as a long LOS can be split in two, thus doubling the 
number of days for which hospitals is compensated under the higher 
rate q−d. Hospitals with higher γ, on the other hand, have short LOS 
so that their entire stay is reimbursed at a premium per diem rate. 
Therefore, there is no additional monetary benefits from splitting a 
treatment into two admissions.
Corollary 1. The likelihood of planned readmission, Φ(2(L*1,L*2) − 1(L* )), is 
a decreasing function of γ. Under the SDR rule, as compared to the FFS 
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reimbursement rule, hospitals with lower (higher) LOS are more (less) 
likely to use planned readmission. 
Corollary 1 can be tested and is supported by empirical evidence. 
Empirical literature indicates that, as predicted by our framework, the 
post-reform decrease of ALOS was accompanied by a rise of the early 
readmission rates and, specifically, planned readmission rates (Hamada 
et al. 2012; Yasunaga et al. 2005; Okamura et al. 2005). Corollary 1 
is directly supported by Table V in Besstremyannaya (2016). Table V 
shows that for hospitals in 76-100 percentiles of the pre-reform ALOS 
the readmission rate increased for eleven out of 15 MDCs,11 as well as 
for the pooled data where all MDCs are combined.
V.  Discussion. Per Diem Payment System in Korea  
(new DRG)
The Japanese payment system is different from prospective payment 
systems employed by other OECD countries in that its DPC component 
is based on a per-diem system. The primary reason for adopting this 
system was to provide hospitals with incentives to treat patients faster 
in order to curb the unusually long ALOS in Japanese hospitals. The 
approach has worked. The ALOS in Japan has declined from 25 days 
in 2000 to 16.2 days in 2017 (OECD 2019). Recently South Korea—that 
used to have the second longest ALOS after Japan and that now has 
the longest ALOS among OECD countries (OECD 2019, Figure 9.9)—
has also implemented a similar per-diem-based payment system.
Historically, South Korea has used FFS as its primary payment 
system, but increasing health care costs along with the lengthy ALOS 
led to a policy debate on an effective way of cost containment (Tchoe 
2002; Kang 2010). Both experts and the government agreed that the 
FFS system, which had been in use since 1977 when the National 
Health Insurance (NHI) was introduced, was the root of uncontrolled 
health care costs (Jang et al. 2016).12 The adoption of a prospective 
11 MDC means Major Diagnostic Category, which is an aggregate group of 
diagnoses such as Nervous System (MDC 1), Eye system (MDC 2) and so on. In 
total there are 18 MDCs, however for Table V data for 15 MDCs was used. See 
Besstremyannaya (2016) for more details.
12 For example, Yang and Park (1991) has shown that under incentives 
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payment system was officially proposed in 1994, however, due to 
strong opposition from private hospitals the implementation of a DRG-
based payment system has been slow. In 2002, the Korean government 
officially introduced a DRG PPS system though it only applied to a 
limited number of disease categories (seven) and the participation was 
voluntary (Annear et al. 2018). The participation became mandatory 
for 7 principal diagnoses since July 2012 and included all medical 
institutions, except for long-term care hospitals and public hospitals, in 
July 2013.
In 2009, the government has introduced another reimbursement 
system which is similar to the Japanese DPC/PDPS system and, just 
like the Japanese system, is a combination of the FFS payments and 
per diem payments (Jang et al. 2016). In July 2012 the system was 
expanded and became a payment system for 550 principal diagnoses 
at all public hospitals. The Korean name for the new system is simply 
“new DRG” (sinpogwaljibuljedo), and in the English-language literature 
it has been called as either Korean Case Payment System (KCPS) or as 
Korean DPC (Ju et al. 2018; Jang et al. 2016). According to this system, 
if hospital days are in the range of 5-95% of its distribution, DRG fee is 
computed as Basic Case Payment + (Hospital days − Average hospital 
days) × per-diem rate. Here the Basic Case Payment is the average 
expenditure per case evaluated at the average of hospital days. For the 
cases whose hospital days are less than 5% or more than 95% of the 
distribution, DRG based fees are not applied and those stays are treated 
as outliers (Tchoe 2010). The “new DRG” system is currently under a 
review by the Ministry of Health and Welfare of Korea and is showing 
mixed results (Shin et al. 2020).
While our paper’s focus is on the Japanese payment system reform, 
as this brief overview of the the Korean payment system indicates, 
Japan is not the only country that moved from the FFS to the per-diem 
based system to try to shorten the LOS. South Korea is employing a 
similar approach and Korean “new DRG” system “appears to be heavily 
influenced by the Japanese DPC system” (Tchoe 2010, p. 222). While 
there are some distinct differences (for a comparison of Japanese and 
Korean payment systems see Tchoe, 2010), the theoretical framework 
provided by the fee-for-service payment system hospitals were overinvesting into 
new technologies despite those investment being not financially sound.
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developed in this paper can be extended to provide theoretical insights 
on how the Korean reform affects hospitals’ financial incentives.
VI. Concluding Remarks
The paper develops a theoretical model that studies how the average 
length of stay is affected by hospitals’ financial incentives under three 
reimbursement policies: a standard fee-for-service system (FFS); a per 
diem PPS system with the per diem rate equal to the average daily 
payments under the FFS system (PD); and a per diem PPS with a step-
down tariff (SDR), where the per diem rate during the initial period 
of stay is higher than for the rest of the patient’s stay. The model is 
designed to incorporate the essential features of the inpatient PPS with 
an LOS-dependent step-down tariff, as implemented in Japan.
We show that a higher per diem rate for initial period, e.g. for the first 
25% of ALOS as it was implemented in the Japanese reform, does not 
generate incentives to shorten the length of stay. Instead, hospitals have 
financial incentives to treat patients longer in order to fully benefit from 
the higher per diem rate. Furthermore, given the emphasis on shorter 
ALOS under the SDR system, hospitals have incentives to use planned 
readmission to shorten the reported length of stay of a single admission. 
Finally, we provide a theoretical explanation for a heterogeneous 
response of hospitals to the reform depending on their pre-reform ALOS 
and our theoretical predictions are supported by empirical evidence. 
First, as predicted in our model, hospitals with longer pre-reform ALOS 
shortened their post-reform ALOS, while for hospitals with shorter pre-
reform ALOS the effect of the reform was the opposite and their post-
reform ALOS has increased (Table IV, Besstremyannaya 2016). Second, 
as also predicted in our model, it is hospitals with longer pre-reform 
ALOS that have most incentives to use planned readmissions (Table V, 
Besstremyannaya 2016).
Although Japan acknowledges the limitations of the per diem rates, 
the country does not plan a changeover to the pure PPS. Moreover, 
introduced in 2003 with the name “inclusive payment system according 
to diagnosis-procedure combinations”, the Japanese PPS was renamed 
in 2010 as “diagnosis-procedure combination/per diem payment 
system”, or DPC/PDPS (MHLW 2012a). In 2012, in an attempt to fine-
tune the step-down per diem rates Japan introduced a modification 
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of the reimbursement schedule: regardless of a hospital’s position 
in the empirical distribution of ALOS, no more than 50% of days for 
each hospital stay can be reimbursed at the highest rates. Based on 
our model, we predict that this change has no effect on less efficient 
hospitals. However, the incentives of more efficient hospitals to keep 
patients longer are weakened. Therefore, the attempt to loosen the 
stimuli within the step-down per diem rate is beneficial from a social 
planner point of view.
(Received March 10 2020; Revised October 21 2020; Accepted October 
26 2020)
References
Anderson, G., & Ikegami, N. How can Japan’s DPC inpatient hospital 
payment system be strengthened. Lessons from the US Medicare 
prospective system. A report of the CSIS global health policy 
center, 2011.
Annear, P. L., Kwon, S., Lorenzoni, L., Duckett, S., Huntington, D., 
Langenbrunner, J. C., Murakami Y., Shon C., & Xu, K. “Pathways 
to DRG-based hospital payment systems in Japan, Korea, and 
Thailand.” Health Policy 122 (No. 7 2018): 707-713.
Ashton, C. M., Del Junco, D. J., Souchek, J., Wray, N. P., & Mansyur, 
C. L. “The association between the quality of inpatient care and 
early readmission: a meta-analysis of the evidence.” Medical care 
(1997): 1044-1059.
Besstremyannaya, G. “Differential Effects of Declining Rates in a Per 
Diem Payment System.” Health Economics 25 (No. 12 2016): 
1599-1618.
Choi, J. K., Kim, S. H., Shin, D. G., & Kang, J. G. “The Effect of Reform 
of New-Diagnosis Related Groups (KDRGs) on Accuracy of 
Payment.” Health Policy and Management 27 (No. 3 2017): 211-
218.
Grabowski, D.C., Afendulis C.C., and T.G. McGuire. “Medicare 
prospective payment system and the volume and intensity of 
skilled nursing facility services.” Journal of Health Economics 30 
(No. 4 2011): 675–684.
Halfon, P., Eggli, Y., Pretre-Rohrbach, I., Meylan, D., Marazzi, A., 
193Hospitals’ Response to a peR Diem payment system
Burnard, B. “Validation of the potentially avoidable hospital 
readmission rate as a routine indicator of the quality of hospital 
care.” Medical Care 44 (No. 11 2006): 972–979.
Hamada, H., Sekimoto, M., and Y. Imanaka. “Effects of the pier diem 
prospective payment system with DRG–like grouping system 
(DPC/PDPS) on resource usage and healthcare quality in Japan.” 
Health Policy 107 (Nos. 2-3 2012): 194–201.
Ikegami, N. “Medical care in Japan,” New England Journal of Medicine 
133 (No. 19 2005): 1295–1299.
   . “Games policy makers and providers play: introducing case-mix-
based payment to hospital chronic care units in Japan,” Journal 
of Health Politics, Policy and Law 34 (No. 3 2009): 361–380.
Im, J. “Hwanjajungsim gachigibanui jaewonilsu gwallibangan (Patient-
centerd Value-based Measures for Management of Length of 
Stay).” Health Insurance Review & Assessment Policy Brief 13 (No. 
4 2019): 45-51. (in Korean)
Im, J., Park, G., Jung, E., Lee, J. “Jaewonilsu jeokjeongseong 
pyeonggabangan maryeon (Development of Evaluation Measure 
on Appropriateness of Length of Stay).” Health Insurance Review 
and Assessment Service, Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2018. (in 
Korean)
Jang, S. I., Nam, C. M., Lee, S. G., Kim, T. H., Park, S., & Park, E. C. “Impact 
of payment system change from per-case to per-diem on high 
severity patient’s length of stay.” Medicine 95 (No. 37 2016).
Ju, Y. J., Park, E. C., Shin, J., Lee, S. A., Choi, Y., & Lee, H. Y. “Association 
between re-admission rate and hospital characteristics for 
ischemic heart disease.” Current Medical Research and Opinion 
34 (No. 3 2018): 441-446.
Kang, G. “Urinara jillyobijibulbosangjedoui gaehyeok: sinpogwalsugaje 
doibui uiuiwa juyo nonjaengjeom (Reform of Health Care 
Reimbursement System in Korea: The Signif icance of 
Introduction of Korean Case Payment System and Major Issues).” 
Korean Academy of Health Policy and Management Conference 
Proceedings 2010 (No. 2 2010): 21-37. (in Korean)
Kondo, A., Kawabuchi, K. “Evaluation of the introduction of a diagnosis 
procedure combination system for patient outcome and 
hospitalisation charges for patients with hip fracture or lung 
cancer in Japan.” Health Policy 107 (Nos. 2-3 2012): 184–193.
Kuwabara, K., Matsuda, S., Fushimi, K., Ishikawa, K.B., Horiguchi, 
194 SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
H., Hayashida, K. and K.Fujimori. “Contribution of case–
mix classification to profiling hospital characteristics and 
productivity.” International Journal of Health Planning and 
Management 26 (No. 3 2011): e138–e150.
Lopes AA, Leavey SF, McCullough K, Gillespie B, Bommer J, Canaud 
BJ, Saito A, Fukuhara S, Held PJ, Port FK, Young EW. “Early 
readmission and length of hospitalization practices in the dialysis 
outcomes and practice patterns study (DOPPS).” Hemodialisys 
International 8 (No. 3 2004): 287–294.
Ma, C. “Cost and quality incentives in health care: a reply.” Journal of 
Economics and Management Strategy 7 (1998): 139–142.
Matsuda, S., K.B. Ishikawa, K. Kuwabara, K. Fujimori, K. Fushimi, and 
H. Hashimoto “Development and use of the Japanese case–mix 
system.” Eurohealth 14 (No. 3 2008): 25–30.
Mayes, R. “The origins, development, and passage of Medicare’s 
revolutionary prospective payment system.” Journal of the 
History of Medicine and Allied Sciences 62 (No. 1 2007): 21–55.
Ministry of Finance. Heisei 24 nendo ippan kaikei saishutsu yosan (Plan 
for annual expenditure from the general accounts 2012), 2012. 
(in Japanese) (http://www.mof.go.jp/budget/budger_workflow/
budget/fy2012/h24_zantei01.pdf)
Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare. Shindangunbunrui–nikansuru 
kokusaikaigi (International conference on DPCs), An outline, 
2004. (in Japanese)
   . Heisei 16 nendo DPC dounyu–no eikyou hyouka–nikansuru 
chousa–oyobi hyouka–nitsuite (On the 2004 survey about the 
effect of the introduction of DPCs), 2005. (in Japanese)
   . Heisei 21 nendo DPC donyuno eikyo hyoukanikakawaru 
chousa. Chosa jisshi setsumei shiryo (Explanatory materials on 
implementing the 2008 survey on the Effect of DPC introduction), 
2009. (in Japanese)
   . Chiiki iryou shien byouin ichiran (A list of local hospitals, 
designated for support), 2012a. (in Japanese) (http://www.mhlw.
go.jp/stf/shingi/2r98520000025aq3–att/2r98520000025awe.
pdf)
   . Heisei 24 nendo shinryouhoushuu kaitei–niokeru DPC(PDPS)–
no taiou–nitsuite (On DPC(PDPS) rates in the 2012 revision of the 
unified fee schedule), 2012b. (in Japanese) (http://www.mhlw.
go.jp/stf/shingi/2r98520000025zci–att/2r98520000025zn7.pdf)
195Hospitals’ Response to a peR Diem payment system
   . Heisei 24 nenpan kouseiroudouhakusho siryouhen (White paper 
on health, labor, and welfare for 2012, supplementary material), 
2012c. (in Japanese) (http://www.mhlw.go.jp/wp/hakusyo/
kousei/12-2/dl/02.pdf)
   . DPC taishoubyouin junbibyouin-no genkyou-nitsuite (On 
the situation with DPC hospitals and DPC-preparatory 
hospitals), 2013. (in Japanese) (http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/
shingi/2r985200000196c4- att/2r985200000196gc.pdf)
   . Review result about correspondence of DPC system (DPC/
PDPS) for 2016 revision (interim report). Subcommittee 
on DPC Evaluation, MHLW, 2015. (in Japanese). (https://
www.mhlw.go.jp/file/05-Shingikai-12404000-Hokenkyoku-
Iryouka/0000104261.pdf)
Nawata, K., & Kawabuchi, K. “Evaluation of the DPC-based inclusive 
payment system in Japan for cataract operations by a new 
model.” Mathematics and Computers in Simulation 93 (2013): 76-
85.
Nawata, K., Nitta, A., Watanabe, S., & Kawabuchi, K. “An analysis of 
the length of stay and effectiveness of treatment for hip fracture 
patients in Japan: Evaluation of the 2002 revision of the medical 
service fee schedule.” Journal of Health Economics 25(No. 4 
2006): 722-739.
OECD. Health at a Glance 2011: OECD Indicators, OECD Publishing, 
2011.
   . Health at a Glance 2015: OECD Indicators, OECD Publishing, 
2015.
   . Health at a Glance 2019: OECD Indicators, OECD Publishing, 
2019.
Okamura, S., Kobayashi, R., and T.Sakamaki. “Case–mix payment in 
Japanese medical care.” Health Policy 74 (No. 3 2005): 282–286.
Okuyama, T. “An action of the DPC Support Tool project team in 
hospital of Sagamihara.” Journal of Japan Hospital Association 4 
(2008): 18–23. (in Japanese)
Sato, M. “DPC dounyu-niokeru shinryou jouhou kanri (Medical data 
management due to introduction of DPCs).” Journal of Japan 
Hospital Association 6 (2007): 52–71. (in Japanese)
Shin, H., Yeo, N., Lee, C., Kang, G., Oh, S., and Lee, J. “Sinpogwaljibuljedo 
sibeomsaeop pyeongga yeongu (Evaluation of Korean Case 
Payment System Pilot Program).” Health Insurance Review and 
196 SEOUL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
Assessment Service, Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2020. (in 
Korean).
Takaku, R., & Yamaoka, A. “Payment systems and hospital length of 
stay: a bunching-based evidence.” International journal of health 
economics and management 19 (No. 1 2019): 53-77.
Tchoe, B. “Diagnosis-related group-based payment system and its 
reform plan in Korea.” Jpn J Health Econ Policy 21 (No. 1 2010): 
213-26.
   . “Gungmingeongangboheomui jaejeongwigi woninbunseokgwa 
pyeongga (Evaluation on the Financial Crisis of National Health 
Insurance).” Korean Social Security Studies 18 (No. 1 2002): 37-
66. (in Korean)
Weissman, J. S., Ayanian, J. Z., Chasan-Taber, S., Sherwood, M. J., 
Roth, C., & Epstein, A. M. “Hospital readmissions and quality of 
care.” Medical care (1999): 490-501.
Yang, B., & Park, Y. “Technology investment by hospitals in Korea.” 
Seoul Journal of Economics 4 (No. 4 1991): 293-310.
Yasunaga, H., H. Ide, T. Imamura, and K. Ohe. “Impacts of the Japanese 
diagnosis procedure combination based payment system on 
cardiovascular medicine–related costs.” International Heart 
Journal 46 (No. 5 2005): 855–866.
Yasunaga, H., H. Ide, T. Imamura, and K. Ohe. “Influence of Japan’s 
new diagnosis procedure combination–based payment system 
on the surgical sector: does it really shorten the hospital stay?” 
Surgery Today 36 (No. 7 2006): 577–585.
197Hospitals’ Response to a peR Diem payment system
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2: From (1) follows that
 pII'(LFFS) = cI'(LFFS) + γg'(LFFS),
and from (4) follows that
	 −d = cI'(LPD) + γg'(LPD). 
The RHS, which is the derivative of the cost function, is an increasing 
function of L. Therefore,
 ( ) if and onl .y if ) FFS PD I FFSL L p I L d′ 
The per-diem rate, −d, does not depend on γ . Term pII'(LFFS) is a 
decreasing function of γ. Indeed, I'(L) is an increasing function of 
L because I(L) is convex; and LFFS is a decreasing function of γ  by 
Proposition 1. Let γ0 be such that pII'(LFFS)|γ	=	γ0 = 
−d, if it exists. Then
1. if γ > γ0 then pII'(LFFS) < 
−d and LPD > LFFS;
2. if γ < γ0 then pII'(LFFS) > 
−d and LPD < LFFS.
3. if γ0 does not exist then either LPD > LFFS for all γ, or LPD < LFFS for all γ.
The result above holds regardless of the value of −d. However, given 
the definition of −d the first case is impossible. Indeed, let −
γ be the lowest 
bound of γ’s support. Then 
 
( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ,
FFS










′ ′= < < 
  
where the first inequality follows from convexity of I(L) and the fact 
that I(0) = 0. The second inequality follows from the fact that LFFS is a 
decreasing function of γ. Thus the only two cases possible are: pII'(LFFS(−γ )) ≤ 
−d < pII'(LFFS(−γ)) and then γ0 exists; or 
−d < pII'(LFFS(−γ )) < pII'(LFFS(−γ)) and then 
LPD < LFFS for all values of γ ∈ [−γ,
−γ ].
Proof of Proposition 3: From (5), (L) is a concave function of L. It is 
differentiable everywhere except for the kink point at L = α−L. Therefore, 
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the optimum is either reached at the point where '(L) = 0 or at α−L. Let 
L*1(γ) denote the unconstrained maximum of the first part of (5) and L*2(γ) 
denote the unconstrained maximum of the second part of (5). Formally, 
L*1(γ) satisfies
 q−d = cI'(L) + γg'(L),
and L*2(γ) satisfies
 τ−d = cI'(L) + γg'(L).
Finally let L*PD(γ) be as defined in equation (4). From the convexity of g 
and I follows that L*1(γ) > L*PD(γ) ≥ L*2(γ), and that all three are decreasing 
functions of γ. Let γ2 be such that L*2(γ2) = α−L, γ1 be such that L*1(γ1) = 
α−L, and γPD be such that L*PD(γPD) = α−L. From q > 1 ≥ τ	follows that γ1 > γPD 
≥ γ2.
There are four cases possible:
a)  γ ≤ γ2: in this case L*1(γ) > L*PD(γ) ≥ L*2(γ) ≥ α−L. Therefore, the global 
maximum is L*SDR(γ) = L*2(γ). The maximum is global because (L) 
is an increasing function when L < α−L, so the maximum of (L), 
cannot be achieved when L < α−L. Compared to the PD system the 
LOS goes down: α−L ≤ L*SDR(γ) ≤ L*PD(γ).
b)  γ2 < γ ≤ γPD: in this case L*1(γ) > L*PD(γ) ≥ α−L ≥ L*2(γ). This case happens 
only when τ < 1, since γ2 = γPD when τ = 1. The global maximum 
is L*SDR(γ) = α−L. Indeed, the first line in (5) is increasing (since L*1(γ) 
> α−L) and the second line is decreasing (since L*2(γ) < α−L) on their 
respective domains. Compared to the PD system the LOS goes 
down: α−L = L*SDR(γ) ≤ L*PD(γ). 
c)  γPD < γ ≤ γ1: in this case L*1(γ) ≥ α−L > L*PD(γ) ≥ L*2(γ). As in case ii), the 
global maximum is L*SDR(γ) = α−L. Compared to the PD system, the 
LOS goes up: α−L = L*SDR(γ) > L*PD(γ). 
d)  γ > γ1: in this case α−L > L*1(γ) > L*PD(γ) ≥ L*2(γ). The global maximum is 
L*SDR(γ) = L*1(γ). Comparing it to the PD case, the LOS goes up.
Cases a) and b) correspond to case i) of the Proposition’s statement. 
Cases c) and d) correspond to case ii) of the Proposition’s statement.
Proof of Proposition 6: It follows from (7) that it is not optimal to have 
Li > α−L > Lj. This is because the per diem payment on admission j pays 
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at premium q, whereas the one on admission i does not. Increasing the 
j’s admission and shortening the i’s admission would result in a higher 
profit.
Lemma 1. At the optimum L*1 = L*2. 
Proof. If L1, L2 < α−L. then they satisfy the FOCs:
 q−d − cI'(L1) = γg'(L1 + L2)
 q−d − cI'(L2) = γg'(L1 + L2),
so that L*1 = L
*
2 and q
−d − cI'(L*2) = γg'(2L*2). Similarly, if L1, L2 > α−L then L*1 = 
L*2.
Having Li = α−L < Lj is not optimal. The FOCs are
 q−d ≥ cI'(α−L) + γg'(L1 + L2) ≥ τ
−d 
 τ−d = cI'(Lj) + γg'(L1 + L2),
where the first line reflects the fact that the profit function is not 
differentiable at Li = α−L. Thus,
 cI'(α−L) ≥ cI'(Lj),
which is a contradiction to α−L < Lj. By a similar argument Li < α−L = Lj 
cannot be optimal either. 
It follows from Lemma 1 that both admissions have equal length, 
L*1 = L
*
2. We will use L
*
2 to denote the length of one admission when the 
hospital treats a patient using planned readmission. If L*2 < α−L then q
−d 
= cI'(L*2) + γg(2L*2); if L*2 = α−L then q
−d ≥ cI'(L*2) + γg'(2L*2) ≥ τ
−d; if L*2 > α−L then 
τ−d = cI'(L*2) + γg'(2L*2).
Several cases are possible depending on the value of γ:
1.  γ is such that γg'(2α−L) + cI'(α−L) > γg'(α−L) + cI'(α−L) ≥ q−d. Then the profit 
with readmission has the global maximum at point where γg'(2L*2) 
+ cI'(L*2) = q
−d, and the profit without readmission has the global 
maximum at point γg'(L*) + cI'(L*) = q−d. Then 2L*2 > L* > L*2. That L* > 
L*2 follows from
	 γg'(2L*) + cI'(L*) > γg'(L*) + cI'(L*) = q−d = γg'(2L*2) + cI'(L*2). 
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 That 2L*2 > L
* follows from
 γg'(2L*2) + cI'(2L*2) > γg'(2L*2) + cI'(2L*2) = q
−d = γg'(L*) + cI'(L*).
 
 Let ∆ denote 2 − 1. We can write it as
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ] [ ( ) ( ) ( )* * * * * *2 2 22 2 2 .qd L cI L g L qd L cI L g Lπ γ γ ∆ = − − − − − 
 
 By the envelope theorem
 
( ) ( )* *22 0.g L g Lπγ
∂∆
= − + <
∂
2.  γ  is such that ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 .g L cI L qd g L cI L dγ α α γ α α τ′ ′+ > + ≥′ ′>
The last two inequalities imply that that L* = α−L. The first inequality 
means that if a hospital is to use planned readmission it is optimal 
to use two planned readmissions, and that L*2 < α−L = L*. That 2L*2 > 
L* follows from
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * * * * *2 2 2 22 2 2 ,g L cI L g L cI L qd g L cI Lγ γ γ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′+ > + = > +
 where the last inequality is due to the fact that α−L = L*.
 In this case ∆ becomes
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ] [ ( ) ( ) ( )* * *2 2 22 2 2 .qd L cI L g L qd L cI L g Lπ γ α α γ α ∆ = − − − − − 
  By the envelope theorem the derivative of the first term with 
respect to γ is −g(2L*2). Since α−L is a constant and does not depend 
on γ the derivative of the second term is −g(α−L). Thus again ∂∆ / 
∂γ < 0.
Two cases are possible as we decrease γ. We will label these two cases 
as Case 3 and Case 3’.
3.  γ  is such that ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 .qd g L cI L g L cI L dγ α α γ α α τ′ ′≥ + > + ≥′ ′  
Then the optimal solution with the readmission is to have L*1 = L
*
2 
= α−L. The optimal solution without the readmission is also L* = α−L. 
Thus L*2 = L
* < 2L*2. The profit difference is
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) ] [ ( ) ( )2 2 2 ,qd L cI L g L qd L cI L g Lπ α α γ α α α γ α ∆ = − − − − − 
 and its derivative with respect to γ is negative.
3’.  Alternatively, γ is such that γg'(2α−L) + cI'(α−L) > q−d > τ−d ≥ γg'(α−L) + 
cI'(α−L). In this case without readmission hospitals would go for long 
admission and with readmission the hospital would go for two 
short admissions. Thus L* ≥ α−L > L*2. By the same logic as in case 
2, we conclude that 2L*2 > L
*. Thus, with planned readmission LOS 
will decrease, L*2 < L
*, but the total number of days will go up 2L*2 > 
L*.
 As for profit difference,
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ] [ ( ) ( ) ( )* * * * * *2 2 22 2 2 ,qd L cI L g L qd L d L L cI L g Lπ γ α τ α γ ∆ = − − − + − − − 
 its derivative with respect to γ is −g(2L*2) + g(L*) < 0.
4.  γ  is such that ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 .qd g L cI L d g L cI Lγ α α τ γ α α′ ′≥ + +′>′ >  
The solution with the readmission is L*1 = L
*
2 = α−L and without it is 
a long readmission L* such that τ−d = γg'(L*) + cI'(L*). Thus L*2 = α−L < 
L*. That 2α−L > L* follows from
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* *2 2 2 .g L cI L g L cI L d g L cI Lγ α α γ α α τ γ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′+ > + > = +
  As in all other cases, the LOS per admission declines but the total 
number of days goes up. Profit difference is
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ] [ ( ) ( ) ( )* * *2 2 2 ,qd L cI L g L qd L d L L cI L g Lπ α α γ α α α γ ∆ = − − − + − − − 
 and its derivative is −g(2α−L) + g(L*) < 0.
5.  γ is such that ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 .d g L cI L g L cI Lτ γ α α γ α α′ ′≥ ′ ′+ > +  Then 
the profit with readmission has the global maximum at a point 
where γg'(2L*2) + cI'(L*2) = τ
−d, and the profit without readmission has 
the global maximum at a point where γg'(L*) + cI'(L*) = τ−d. Thus, and 
L*2 > α−L and L* > α−L. Furthermore, one can show that 2L*2 > L* > L*2.
 That L* > L*2 follows from
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * * * * *2 22 2 .g L cI L g L cI L d g L cI Lγ γ τ γ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′+ > + = = +
 That 2L*2 > L
* follows from
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * * * * *2 2 2 22 2 2 .g L cI L g L cI L d g L cI Lγ γ τ γ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′+ > + = = +
 
  As before the derivative of the profit difference with respect to γ is 
equal to ( ) ( )* *2/ 2 0g L g Lπ γ∂∆ ∂ = − + < .
  Thus we showed that for every γ using the readmission becomes 
more lucrative as γ goes down. 
Furthermore, 2L*2 ≥ L
* > L*2. 
